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ABSTRACT  
Using panel data for the period of 1975-2011, this study attempts to answer the question of 
whether the quantity or quality of foreign aid matters to economic growth of least 
developed countries (LDCs). Quality effects are captured using different specifications of 
both bilateral and multilateral aid. The quantity effects are measured by the squared term 
on the aid variable. The timing of effects between aid and growth are controlled for using 
both short term (annual) and long term (5-year averaged) panel data. Issues of 
endogeneity, measurement bias, simultaneity and reverse causality are addressed. 
Generally, after controlling for trade, fiscal and monetary policies and other institutional 
factors, results from this study support the conclusion that quantity rather than quality of 
aid matters for economic growth of LDCs. These results are robust to different samples and 
estimation techniques. Nonetheless, the study does not discount the importance of the 
quality of aid, rather, emphasizes that regardless of the type of aid flows, quantity and 
continuous flow is important for LDCs.  
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Quantity or Quality? Foreign Aid Implications on Economic Growth in Least Developed 
Countries 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been forty decades since the first United Nations (UN) program of action in support 
of least developed countries (LDCs) was developed and adopted in 1981 at the Paris UN 
conference on the LDCs. The objective of this program of action was to provide targeted 
support to the special needs of these countries with a goal of steering them on a sustained, 
accelerated, pro-growth and development path. Three additional programs of action have 
been adopted since; yet, these countries continue to face widespread poverty. 
Notwithstanding, most of these countries are still struggling to meet the goals set in those 
programs of action, including the millennium development goals (MDGs).  
 
Overseas development assistance (ODA) or foreign aid, remain the largest source of 
external financing of the development of LDCs.  At the recent 2011 UN conference on LDCs 
held in Istanbul, Turkey, a renewed call was made for increased foreign aid flows to LDCs 
[targeted at approximately 0.15% to 0.20% of gross national income for development 
assistance committee (DAC) members]. Yet, little conclusive empirical evidence exists in 
literature in support of growth enhancing relationship between foreign aid and economic 
growth. Nevertheless, some studies have recommended doubling foreign aid flows, 
especially to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005; EU, 
2005 and Sachs, 2005). The argument in these studies holds that the current quantity of 
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foreign aid flowing into these countries is not sufficient to provide the needed “big push” in 
order for them to leapfrog out of the poverty trap.  
 
Literature on aid-growth linkage is vast but empirical findings are mixed. The results range 
from neutral relationship (Boone, 1996; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004 and Easterly, 
2007a, 2007b, 2005) to significant but growth depressing effects (Bobba and Powell, 
2007). Other studies have argued that aid can be growth enhancing under certain 
conditions (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp, 2004). Furthermore, some have emphasized on the type of aid and timing of aid 
effects as important factors in determining the effectiveness of aid on growth (Minoiu and 
Reddy, 2009). Another key factor that has come up in this literature is the functional form 
of the aid-growth equation. Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi (2011), for example, 
provide empirical evidence in support of the non-linear relationship. They cite the lack of 
non-linear specification as the reason why Burnside and Dollar (2000) did not find non-
conditional aid effects on growth. Besides, including the non-linear effects lend support to 
the implications of aid in the poverty trap theory.  
 
Majority of these studies, including the most influential ones [Boone, 1996; Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008], have based their 
conclusions on data of developing countries as a group. Conclusions based on such general 
data set can be misleading. Different income groups within developing countries, vary, for 
example, in terms of economic structure (see figure 1 in appendix), policy formulation 
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environment and access to international capital markets, all of which may influence a 
country’s aid absorptive capacity and hence its effectiveness.  Furthermore, the growth of 
countries that have good access to international capital markets, may be determined by 
other factor besides foreign aid (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) 
 
The most vulnerable of the developing countries and the most highly advocated (by the 
international community) for increased aid flow, are the LDCs. Yet, there is little empirical 
analysis on aid effectiveness in these countries as a group. This study fills in that gap. We 
attempt to answer the question: is it the quantity or quality of aid that matters for 
economic growth of LDCs? Consequently, we transcend the conventional approach of 
focusing exclusively on total aid and provide a comprehensive analysis based on different 
types of aid [total bilateral aid, bilateral aid based on sub-groups, bilateral aid from US, UK 
and EU and Multilateral aid from United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNTA, 
UNHCR and WFP1)].  We pay attention to the rationale provided in Clemens et al (2011) for 
the divergence in the empirical findings and suggestions of harmonizing the results in 
literature.  
 
Additionally, we account for the non-linear effects of aid on growth, based on the argument 
in the takeoff hypothesis (Sachs, 2005). The findings from this paper will contribute to the 
discussions on the relevancy of aid on economic growth of LDCs and its importance (if any) 
in helping them graduate from the least developed countries status. Methodological issues 
such as endogeneity bias, measurement bias, simultaneity and reverse causality bias are 
5 
 
addressed. Arellano-Bond system Generalized Methods of Moment (SGMM) is used as the 
primary estimation technique. Nonetheless, results based on fixed effects (FE) are also 
reported. Our findings are robust to different aid specifications, samples and estimation 
techniques. The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section II highlights the relevant 
literature, section III focuses on methodology and results, and section IV concludes.   
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are three strands of literature that explain the foreign aid – growth relationship in 
poor countries: the takeoff hypothesis, the conditionality requirement and the “timing and 
type of aid” argument. The takeoff hypothesis strand advocates for increased flow of 
foreign aid to poor countries (Sachs, 2005).  The underlying argument hinges on the fact 
that LDCs face a big financing gap. As a result, their physical capital accumulation has failed 
to keep up with the depreciation and the high population growth rates2.  The financing gap 
is caused by among other factors; their low domestic savings, limited and undiversified tax 
base and poor access to international capital markets. Consequently, they lack sufficient 
capital stock required to lift them above subsistence level onto a more accelerate and rapid 
development path. In other words, there exists a threshold level3 of capital stock, beyond 
which capital begins to have meaningful growth enhancing effects. Therefore, a reasonable 
and sustained flow of foreign aid can help these countries meet and surpass  that minimum 
capital stock, necessary for the takeoff into self sustained growth4 (UNDP, 2005; IMF and 
World Bank, 2005;EU, 2005) .  
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Empirical studies have attempted to incorporate this concavity of physical capital – growth 
relationship by including both the linear and non-linear specifications of foreign aid in the 
growth equation. The non-linear term is either entered as a standalone (Dalgaard and 
Hansen, 2001; Lensik and White, 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2001, 2004; Clemens et 
al. 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008;  Moreira, 2005) or as an interaction with a policy 
variable (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). The sign on the non-linear term has varied across 
studies.  However, in line with the takeoff hypothesis, it is expected for the linear term to 
have a negative sign, while the squared term to have a positive sign.  
 
Anecdotal evidence provides some hint as to why the squared term of aid has not fared 
consistently in empirical analysis. For example, there are some poor countries in Africa that 
have received relatively large amount of aid for prolonged periods of time with no 
improvement in their economic growth and poverty reduction. Easterly (2006) points out 
that a large proportion of these aid flows has been used, in some cases, to finance growth-
retarding government consumption rather than growth-enhancing public investment.  
 
The second strand of literature (conditionality strand) holds that certain conditions in the 
aid recipient country must be in place before foreign aid effects on growth can be realized. 
The championing study in this line of argument is that of Burnside and Dollar (2000). This 
study examines the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth within certain 
macroeconomic policies environment.  They use a sample of 56 developing countries, with 
the data averaged over 4-year periods, starting with 1970-73 to 1990-1993. They 
concluded that aid tends to be more effective in developing countries with good fiscal, 
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monetary and trade policies (as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between aid and their calculated policy index). Nonetheless, when they 
interact the non-linear specification of aid with the policy index, the resulting coefficient is 
insignificant (with a negative sign) – putting more emphasize on the policy rather than the 
surge in aid as predicted in the takeoff hypothesis.  
 
Despite the numerous criticisms of the Burnside and Dollar [see Easterly 2003; Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman 2004] approach and their emphasis on the policy condition, other 
studies have also arrived at a similar conclusion (Collier and Dollar, 2002). Nevertheless, 
other critics have provided competing evidence, suggesting, for example, that geographical 
factors (such as the proportion of  a country’s land in the tropics), which account for “deep 
structural” characteristics, rather than policies, are key in determining the effectiveness of 
foreign aid on growth (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2001, 2004; Roodman, 2004). 
Geographical factors, for example, may affect productivity, especially in the agricultural 
sector (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001, 2003 and Masters and McMillan, 2001) and 
may also have influence on slow moving structural characteristics such as institutions 
(Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Acemoglu, Simon and James, 2002). Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp (2004) captures the conditional effects of aid on economic growth by interacting aid 
with the proportion of land in the tropics. Based on their empirical analysis, they provide a 
convincing conclusion that their findings (that aid is ineffective in the tropics) are superior 
to those based on policy interaction (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and concavity effects 
(Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001).  Roodman (2004) asserted that foreign aid works well 
outside of the tropic and not in the tropical countries. However, Radelet, Clemens and 
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Bhavnani, (2005) dismisses the validity of geographical factors as merely a separation of 
countries where aid has worked from those countries where it has failed, rather than an 
explanation of a causation of aid ineffectiveness.  
 
The third strand of literature incorporates some of the elements from the aforementioned 
two strands with an additional twist.  They account for the quality of aid and the timing of 
aid effects on growth (Clemens et al, 2011; Minoiu and Reddy, 2009; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Headey, 2007; Bobba and Powell, 2007; Clemens, Radelet and 
Bhavnani, 2004). In reference to the quality of aid, these studies distinguish between 
multilateral aid5 and bilateral aid and, further, separate development aid (non-
geopolitical/non-geostrategic) from non-development aid (geopolitical/geostrategic6).    
They conclude that aid flows based on geopolitical factors have neutral effects on growth, 
while the non-geopolitical aid have growth enhancing effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 
2008; Bobba and Powell, 2007).  
 
Timing of the aid impact also matters in determining the aid-growth relationship (Clemens 
et. al, 2011). For example, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) find that aid allocated to 
sectors such as agriculture, industry and public infrastructure investment tend to have 
immediate/short run impact on growth, relative to aid supporting democracy, 
environment, health and education, which usually has postponed/late impact on growth. 
Overall, development aid (aid allocated towards investment spending), will tend to have 
immediate/direct impact on the economy and support long run economic growth, while 
non-development aid (aid responding to disasters or social issues) will tend to have 
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indirect impact on economic growth. Therefore, effects stemming from development aid 
are more likely to be captured in the short run data relative to those coming from non-
development aid (Clemens et al, 2011).   
 
An area that has received little attention in the aid-growth literature is how aid effects are 
transmitted to growth. Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) attempted to address the 
transmission question. Using a sample of 25 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 
of 1970-1997, they find that aid effects are transmitted to growth via investment spending. 
They dismiss government consumption spending as a possible transmission mechanism.  
They also find that while aid has some effects on imports, imports do not matter in growth.  
Boone (1996) also provided evidence supporting the positive relationship between aid and 
investment.  
 
Generally, empirical studies have yielded divergent evidence on aid-growth linkage7. These 
divergent results, according to Clemens et.al (2011), are due to; (i) lack of controlling of the 
timing of aid effects on growth and, (ii) using invalid and/or weak instrumental variables. 
Particularly, results in the leading studies [Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2008] in the aid-growth literature rests their strength of accounting for 
aid endogeneity primarily on population growth.  To resolve this divergence, Clemens et al 
(2011) incorporates three changes in the three leading studies. First, they allow aid to 
affect growth with a time lag. Second, they first-difference the data to remove the effects of 
time invariant omitted variables. Third, they disaggregate aid data into “early impact” and 
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late impact” components. By incorporate these changes they arrive at a harmonized 
conclusion that aid has modest growth-enhancing effects.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the variables used in the empirical model and the estimation 
techniques. We also discuss the samples used, our sensitivity analysis and variable and 
data description. Finally we present our results based on the baseline regressions and 
robust checks.  
 
4.1. Empirical Model 
Unbalanced panel data is used to evaluate the impact of foreign aid on economic growth of 
39 least developed countries for the period of 1975 to 2010. We exclude nine countries (3 
in Africa and 6 in Asia8) due to missing data on most of the variables. Following Minoiu and 
Reddy (2009), we disaggregate the aid data into various categories: total overseas 
development assistance; total bilateral aid; bilateral aid from US, UK and EU; bilateral aid 
based on three sub-groups and multilateral aid from UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, 
UNTA, UNHCR, UNTA and WFP). This allows us to observe the distinct effects on growth 
from the different types of aid.  
 
Total overseas development assistance is assumed to have both early impact and late 
impact components. We also assume that bilateral aid has both geostrategic and non-
geostrategic components. For example, if UK and France rewards their former colonies 
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(regardless of the county’s policy environment and political institutions), then we expect 
such bilateral aid to have a different impact relative to a non-geostrategic aid. On the other 
hand, we assume that the effects of multilateral aid from UN agencies depend on the goals 
and objectives of that agency. For example, the goal of United Nations Development 
Programs (UNDP) is to help countries achieve their development objectives. UNDP works 
with individual countries in areas including; poverty reduction, democratic governance, 
crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy and HIV/Aids. Therefore, we 
expect aid from UNDP to have immediate and sustainable impact on growth relative to aid 
from United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), which responds to growth-
retarding crisis. Overall, we expect a large proportion of aid from the UN agencies to have 
delayed but sustainable impact on growth.  
 
We also run regressions based on bilateral aid from 3 sub groups. Countries under each 
group are identified based on the commitment to development index (CDI, 20119) that 
ranks donors based on among other factors; quantity and quality of aid, openness to trade 
and investment policies10. Group 1 consists of 5 Scandinavian countries that have the 
highest ranking on the CDI index (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland) and therefore 
assumed to provide development friendly aid. Group 2 consists of group 1 plus 5 non-
Scandinavian countries (Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland) that are 
also believed to provide development friendly aid. Group 3 consists of group 1 plus 
Belgium, France, Switzerland, UK and US. Aid from France, UK and US is assumed to be 
geostrategic in nature. Overall, the degree of development friendliness decreases as we 
move from group 1 to group 3.  
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In order to evaluate whether aid effects in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) LDCs are different 
from non-sub-Saharan Africa LDCs, we report results based on the SSA sub-sample. Due to 
the small sample size of the non-SSA LDCs, and thus the inefficiency of the regressions, we 
do not report results using this sub-sample. The baseline regressions are based on the 
annual (short period) panel data, allowing us to increase the efficiency of the regressions 
(because the panel is unbalanced and therefore, some countries have very few data points). 
However, this approach also enables us to determine whether timing of aid effects 
influences aid effectiveness on growth. Moreover, according to Clemens eta al (2011), short 
periods decrease the bias from omitted variables that change slowly over time and permit 
estimates with country-specific effects (Islam, 1995) to remove the bias of omitted time 
invariant characteristics.  Nonetheless, for robust checks and to be consistent with other 
studies, we also regress initial values of aid on 5-year averaged growth data (with the 
exception of the last period), giving us 7 non-overlapping periods from 1975-1979 to 2005-
2010. This allows us to net out the short run cyclical effects, to counter the effects of 
reverse causality (Kumar and Woo, 2010) and to control for the timing of aid effects.  
 
We follow closely the findings in Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) in selecting 
the core sets of growth determinants; however, the estimated model is constraint by the 
available data and sample size. Specifically, we include general government consumption 
share, trade openness and geographical dummies. System GMM (SGMM) of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is used as the primary estimation technique.  
SGMM controls for various methodological biases such as; endogeneity bias, measurement 
bias, unobserved country-specific fixed effects and omitted variable bias. Also relative to 
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different GMM, SGMM is robust to weak instruments bias. It uses suitable lagged levels and 
lagged first differences of the regressors as their instruments. In accordance with GMM 
estimation techniques, Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond 
test that the average autocovariance of residuals of order two is zero are reported. 
Additionally, we conduct sensitivity analysis using fixed effects (FE) estimation technique. 
While FE controls for omitted variable bias that arises due to the correlation between 
country specific effects and the regressors, it also suffers from endogeneity and 
measurement error.   
 
In the formal analysis, we evaluate the effects of the aforementioned categories of aid on 
economic growth while controlling for other determinants of growth, broadly defined as; 
policy variables, institutional variables and dummy variables. The argument that good 
policies are a precondition for aid effectiveness has been widely debated since Burnside 
and Dollar (2000). While the disagreements are obvious, there is hardly any contention on 
the importance of good macroeconomic policies for economic growth. As a result, most 
studies have incorporated some elements of policy measure in their aid-growth 
regressions, with the main focus on the monetary, fiscal and trade policies. 
 
Monetary policy is usually proxied by inflation rate (Fischer, 1993). Fiscal policy on the 
other hand has been proxied by budget surplus and in some cases, government 
consumption spending (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro, 1991). Because of lack of 
sufficient data on trade policy instruments (such as tariffs and non-tariffs barrier), a 
number of studies have used either, Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index or the 
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recently updated index by Wacziag and Welch (2003). The problem with this index is that 
its data is available until 2000. Consequently, this may create a problem of misclassifying a 
country as closed when in fact; it has made significant progress towards openness in the 
last ten years. Nevertheless, other studies have used policy outcome measures such as 
trade volume as a share of GDP as a proxy for trade openness (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikuma, 2007).  
 
In this study we follow what has been used elsewhere in literature and include in the 
regression analysis a measure of trade, monetary and fiscal policies, hereby defined as the 
policy variables. We use inflation rate, government consumption spending11 and share of 
trade volume in GDP as proxies for monetary, fiscal and trade policies respectively. Because 
of the inconclusive results in literature on the interaction between aid and policy12, we do 
not include that interaction term in this study.  
 
Another group of variables that have been factored into the aid-growth equation are the 
institutional variables; a measure of governance, political stability, development of financial 
market institutions and social services institutions. Good governance and political stability 
both provide conducive environment for economic growth. Particularly, proponents of the 
free market system argue that in countries where the role of the government is limited, for 
example, to providing public goods such as infrastructure and public security; maintaining 
the rule of law and enforcing contracts, not only reduces social discontent but also ensures 
a healthy private sector competition, which promotes productivity and growth. 
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Furthermore, a country with good governance is also more likely to promote growth 
enhancing policies.  
 
Polity2 index from the polity IV project (2011) is used as a proxy for governance. The index 
is measured on a scale of -10 to 10; with -10 indicating strongly autocratic (political 
suppression) and 10, strongly democratic (political freedom). Barro (1994) assessed the 
effects of democracy on growth using a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. He 
found that, after controlling for all other core determinants of growth, democracy had a 
weak negative effect on growth. In a non-linear specification however, there was evidence 
that democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom, but depresses growth 
when moderate level of freedom has been achieved. Consequently, we specify this measure 
of governance in both linear and quadratic form.  
 
The proportion of Money supply (M2 or M3) in GDP is used as a proxy for the depth of the 
financial market development. King and Levine (1993) evaluates the effects of Money 
supply13  (expressed as a share of GDP) and three other alternative measures of financial 
market development and conclude that higher levels of financial market development 
accelerates economic growth, by leading growth. Additionally, they found that the effects 
based on the money supply measure were stronger in poor countries.  
 
The need to control for fertility rate in aid-growth regressions was highlighted in Easterly 
(2006). There are a number of ways that increasing fertility rate can have undesirable 
effects on economic growth. For example, increasing fertility rates can negatively impact 
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economic growth by diverting resources away from production goods to childrearing 
(Becker and Barro, 1988). It can also penalize the steady state level of output per worker in 
the neoclassical growth model. Specifically, if the population is growing faster than the 
level of economic growth, then a portion of the economy’s investment is allocated towards 
providing capital for new workers, rather than increasing capital per worker (Barro, 1994). 
These effects can have undesirable implications on aid effectiveness. On the other hand, 
declining fertility rates can be an indication of the development of social institutions such 
as healthcare and education (which expands with economic growth) (Schultz, 1989; 
Behrman, 1990 and Barro and Lee, 1994) 
 
Finally we include a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa, since, 69% of LDCs are in sub-
Saharan Africa, with the remaining 29% in Asia and only one country in Latin America. The 
lag of the log of real per capita GDP is included in line with the standard Barro (1991) 
growth model, to test for convergence across countries over time towards a common level 
of real per capita income. 
 
Based on the discussions above, the formal regression equation is as outlined in equation 
(1) below: 
2
0 1 1 2 3 4 5
2
6 7 8 9 10 11
log log log log log
log(1 ) log 2 2 2 log
it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
RPYG RPY Aid Aid Trade G
Infl M Polity Polity Fertility dSSA
β β β β β β
β β β β β β ε
−∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +
  
Where: RPYG and RPYt-1 are the real per capita GDP growth and the lag of real per capita 
GDP respectively, in country i at time t.  0β  is the common intercept, itε  is the error term 
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and ∆  is the difference operator. Aid and Aid2 are the various aid categories (as previously 
defined) and its quadratic form, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Trade is the share of 
trade in goods and services expressed as a percentage of GDP – a proxy for trade policy.  G 
is the share of general government consumption expenditure in GDP – a proxy for fiscal 
policy. Infl is the inflation rate (consumer prices) – proxy for monetary policy. M2 is the 
money and quasi money (as a percentage of GDP). Polity2 and Polity22 is measure of 
governance from the polity IV project and its square.  Fertility – fertility rate (birth per 
woman).  dSSA is the dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa LDCs.  
 
4.2. Data and Econometric Results 
All the data are downloaded from World Bank’s World Development indicators (2012) 
website. The least developed countries included in the sample are drawn from the website 
of United Nations office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, 
landlocked developing Countries and Small Island developing countries (UN-OHRLLS). A 
country is classified as a least developed country based on UN’s 3 criteria: low-income 
criterion, human assets index and economic vulnerability index. Also, to qualify as an LDC, 
the country’s population must not exceed 75 million. Currently there are 48 LDCs; 33 in 
Africa, 14 in Asia and Pacific and 1 in Latin America.  A list of the LDCs used in this study 
can be found in table (A.1). 
 
Variable description and notation explanation is detailed in table (A.2). Descriptive 
Statistics and correlation matrix of selected variables used in our model are provided in 
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Tables A.3 and A.4 respectively.   Table 1 contains baseline regression results using SGMM. 
Consistency check regressions using averaged data and fixed effects estimation techniques 
are reported in table 2 and 3 respectively. The SGMM results pass the Sargan test for 
validity of the instruments and the Arellano bond test of average autocovariance of 
residuals. We also conduct the Hausman test, which rejects the random effect in favor of 
fixed effects.  
 
In an attempt to answer the question of whether the quantity or quality of foreign aid 
matters to economic growth of LDCs, we analyze aid effects based on different categories of 
aid. Additionally, we include a squared term to capture the concavity effects as predicted by 
the takeoff hypothesis. Table 1.1 reports results based on total aid (overseas development 
assistance), total bilateral aid and aid from EU, UK and US. After controlling for policy, 
institutional and other determinants of growth, we find a significant U-shaped relationship 
between aid and economic growth, regardless of the type of aid. This is contrary to the 
expectations and literature predictions due to some elements of geostrategic (delayed 
impact effects) in these aid categories. Also the coefficient on the dummy variable for sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) LDCs is statistically significant in the three (total aid, total bilateral aid 
and bilateral aid from UK) out of the five categories. The lack of significance in the SSA 
dummy under the EU category is somewhat surprising since a large proportion of EU aid 
flows to SSA LDCs relative to Asian and Latin America LDCs (see figure 2) 
Table 1.1 about here 
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Notwithstanding, when we disaggregate the data and focus on the SSA sub-sample, we find 
a highly significant U-shaped relationship across all the five aid categories.  
Table 1.2 about here 
 
Table 1.3 tabulates the results based on aid from six UN agencies. Again a highly significant 
U-shaped relationship between aid and economic growth is observed across all the aid 
categories. The dummy variable for SSA is positive and significant in all categories with the 
exception of aid from UNICEF and WFP. Generally, aid flows from the six UN agencies 
averages less than 1% of these countries’ GDP (see figure 3). Additionally, annual trends 
signal declining flows since 1996, coinciding with the World Bank/IMF debt relief 
initiatives (see figure 4).  
Table 1.3 about here 
 
Table 1.4 provides estimates based on the SSA sub-sample. Similarly, we observe a U-
shaped significant relationship between aid from all the UN agencies and economic growth 
of SSA LDCs.  
Table 1.4 about here 
 
In addition, we follow specifications in Minoiu and Reddy (2009) and categorize bilateral 
aid into three groups (as previously defined). Aid based on these groups is used as proxies 
for development friendly aid. The degree of development friendliness decreases as we 
move from group 1 to group 3. Findings based on these categories are tabulated in table 
1.5. Table 1.5 contains results from the full sample and SSA sub-sample. These results 
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support the findings tabulated in tables 1.1 – 1.4. Needless to mention, a significant U-
shaped relationship is observed, regardless of the aid category and sample.  
Table 1.5 about here 
 
Generally, based on the baseline regression results above, it is evident that it is not the type 
of aid that matters to economic growth of LDCs, rather, the quantity of aid. Also, notice 
these results are based on annual panel data, reinforcing, in hindsight that the timing of aid 
effects is not as important as the quantity of aid.  
 
To ensure that these results are robust even when timing of aid effects is factored into the 
regressions, we run regressions using initial values of aid (at the beginning of each period)  
on 5-year averaged growth data. Due to the unbalanced nature of panel data, we are limited 
to the 5-year average – going beyond that only decreases the efficiency of the model. 
Results based on these regressions are tabulated in tables 2. The U-shaped relationship is 
still apparent, even in cases where the relationship is not significant.  
 
Nonetheless, table 2.1 indicates that initial values of aggregated aid (total aid, total bilateral 
and bilateral from EU) relative to aid from individual donors (US and UK) matters to 
economic growth of LDCs. The lack of meaningful relationship between initial values of US 
and UK aid on subsequent growth might be due to quantity effects rather than quality 
effects. This reasoning is supported by the observed significant effects when annual data is 
used, signifying that continuous flows (rather a onetime lump sum) of aid matters to 
economic growth in these countries (partly because of the significance of foreign aid in the 
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development budgets of these countries). We also find that SSA dummy is positive and 
significant only in the aggregate aid categories.  
Table 2.1 about here 
 
The above effects are also observed when the bilateral aid is categorized into the three 
groups. The significant effects increase with the level of aggregation and not the quality of 
aid. For example, while a significant U-shaped relationship is observed in group 3, we do 
not observe the same in groups 1 and 2. Particularly the average share of group 3 bilateral 
aid in GDP for the period of 1975-2010 was 5.47% compared to 1.3% and 2.1% for groups 
1 and 2 respectively (see descriptive statistics in table A.3).  
Table 2.2 about here. 
 
Table 2.3 also provides support for a significant U-shaped relationship in the cases of aid 
from United Nations development programs (UNDP) and United Nations transition 
authority (UNTA). Furthermore, the dummy variable for SSA is significant only in those two 
cases 
Table 2.3 about here 
 
The results based on FE estimation technique is tabulated in table 3 (see appendix). While 
these results are affected by methodological biases such as endogeneity bias and 
measurement error, they still provide a consistent pattern similar to the one observed 
above. Particularly, we observe the U-shaped relationship between aid and economic 
growth of LDCs regardless of the type of aid.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Using panel data for the period of 1975 – 2010, this study attempts to answer the question 
of whether the quantity or quality of aid matters to economic growth of least developed 
countries (LDCs). To capture the quality effects, we use different categories of both 
bilateral and multilateral aid, in addition to the total aid and total bilateral aid. The quantity 
effects are measured by the squared term on the aid variable. Both short term (annual) and 
long term (5-year averaged) panel data are used. This allows us to test the timing of aid 
effects. Methodological issues such as endogeneity bias, measurement error and reverse 
causality are addressed. After controlling for trade, fiscal and monetary policies and other 
institutional factors, results support the conclusion that quantity rather than quality of aid 
matters for economic growth of least developed countries. These results are robust when 
the SSA sub-sample is used and when FE estimation technique is used. Nonetheless, the 
study does not discount the importance of the quality of aid, rather, emphasizes that 
regardless of the type of aid flows, quantity and continuous flow is important.  
 
The findings of this study lend support to the Sachs (2005) takeoff hypothesis, at least for 
the case of LDCs. While the channel through which aid affects economic growth is beyond 
the scope of this paper, further empirical analysis is required to establish whether the 
transmission mechanism of aid effects on growth are via investment spending as predicted 
by the takeoff hypothesis.  
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Table 1.1 
     
Table 1.1: Aid Impact on Growth, based on Annual data (Full sample, SGMM 
Estimation) 
 Total Aid 
Bilateral 
Aid 
Bilateral - 
EU 
Bilateral - 
UK 
Bilateral - 
US 
∆logrpyt-1 
-9.48 
(3.01)**** 
-8.6 
(3.06)*** 
-6.36 
(3.11)** 
-13.15 
(3.49)*** 
-14.24 
(4.2)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-9.63 
(2.38)**** 
-8.83 
(2.36)*** 
-10.28 
(2.41)*** 
-10.71 
(2.53)*** 
-12.24 
(2.79)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
4.72 
(1.36)**** 
4.04 
(1.29)*** 
4.94 
(1.24)*** 
5.17 
(1.28)*** 
5.78 
(1.43)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
5.32 
(1.49)*** 
5.68 
(1.49)*** 
5.53 
(1.48)*** 
5.89 
(1.82)*** 
5.64 
(1.7)*** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.08 
(0.3) 
-0.04 
(0.3) 
-0.1 
(0.3) 
-0.08 
(0.3) 
-0.04 
(0.31) 
∆log(G) 
-1.75 
(1.39) 
-1.83 
(1.39) 
-2.52 
(1.39)** 
-2.96 
(1.51)** 
-0.81 
(1.53) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
-15.11 
(5.24)*** 
-13.82 
(5.32)*** 
-14.87 
(5.78)*** 
-13.96 
(6.08)*** 
-10.91 
(6.77)* 
∆Polity2 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.12)* 
∆Polity22 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.02)*** 
∆log M2 
-3.13 
(1.81)* 
-2.99 
(1.81)* 
-4.19 
(1.83)*** 
-0.75 
(1.95) 
-1.72 
(2.16) 
Dummy- SSA 
0.25 
(0.13)** 
0.23 
(0.13)* 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.36 
(0.16)*** 
0.18 
(0.16) 
Constant 
-0.47 
(0.12)*** 
-0.42 
(0.12)*** 
-0.55 
(0.12)*** 
-0.47 
(0.15)*** 
-0.37 
(0.17)*** 
N 257 257 253 206 215 
Sargan (p>χ2) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.933 0.972 0.994 0.166 0.745 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 1.2 
     
Table 1.2: Aid Impact on Growth, based on Annual data (sub-Saharan Africa LDCs, 
SGMM Estimation) 
 Total Aid 
Bilateral 
Aid 
Bilateral - 
EU 
Bilateral - 
UK 
Bilateral - 
US 
∆logrpyt-1 
-29.11 
(7.31)*** 
-28.26 
(7.36)*** 
-24.53 
(8.06)*** 
-34.79 
(7.82)*** 
-29.3 
(7.39)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-21.63 
(5.08)*** 
-20.62 
(5.01)*** 
-22.78 
(5.05)*** 
-25.33 
(5.29)*** 
-21.89 
(4.94)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
10.72 
(2.8)*** 
9.83 
(2.62)*** 
11.5 
(2.59)*** 
12.39 
(2.63)*** 
10.79 
(2.55)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
5.27 
(3.52) 
6.13 
(3.32)** 
5.02 
(3.35)*** 
5.52 
(3.79) 
5.14 
(3.30) 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.48 
(0.5) 
-0.45 
(0.5) 
-0.4 
(0.5) 
-0.8 
(0.53) 
-0.42 
(0.51) 
∆log(G) 
2.83 
(2.11) 
2.47 
(2.11) 
2.72 
(2.11) 
2.24 
(2.23) 
2.72 
(2.07) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
-21.01 
(17.11) 
-16.14 
(17.5) 
-10.94 
(19.08) 
-20.72 
(17.22) 
-18.06 
(16.83) 
∆Polity2 
-0.28 
(0.2) 
-0.25 
(0.2) 
-0.3 
(0.2) 
-0.23 
(0.33) 
-0.04 
(0.24) 
∆Polity22 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
∆log M2 
-8.38 
(3.21)*** 
-8.07 
(3.21)*** 
-8.25 
(3.21)*** 
-7.07 
(3.49)** 
-8.42 
(3.23)*** 
Constant 
-0.48 
(0.18)*** 
-0.41 
(0.19)*** 
-0.54 
(0.19)*** 
-0.43 
(0.22)** 
-0.39 
(0.19)*** 
N 111 111 109 88 108 
Sargan (p>χ2) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.647 0.727 0.686 0.332 0.744 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 1.3 
       
Table 1.3: Aid Impact on Growth, based on Annual data (Full sample, SGMM Estimation) 
 UNDP UNFPA 
UNICEF UNTA UNHCR WFP 
∆logrpyt-1 
-8.45 
(3.1)*** 
-6.66 
(3.48)** 
-7.47 
(3.11)*** 
-10.38 
(3.07)*** 
-30.64 
(6.97)*** 
-6.03 
(3.36)* 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-9.34 
(2.3)*** 
-9.36 
(2.48)*** 
-9.18 
(2.34)*** 
-14.41 
(2.63)*** 
-18.68 
(3.7)*** 
-11.82 
(2.61)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
4.94 
(1.15)*** 
4.71 
(1.34)*** 
4.63 
(1.23)*** 
7.76 
(1.41)*** 
9.48 
(1.88)*** 
5.77 
(1.34)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
5.37 
(1.5)*** 
4.56 
(1.55)*** 
3.6 
(1.67)*** 
4.35 
(1.49)*** 
7.62 
(2.59)*** 
5.49 
(1.8)*** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.14 
(0.31) 
-0.08 
(0.31) 
-0.09 
(0.31) 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
-0.19 
(0.37) 
-0.1 
(0.31) 
∆log(G) 
-1.79 
(1.42) 
-1.43 
(1.47) 
-1.59 
(1.48) 
-2.52 
(1.43)* 
-0.2 
(2.37) 
-2.45 
(1.51)* 
 ∆log(fertility) 
-15.81 
(5.35)*** 
-14.53 
(5.87)*** 
-10.02 
(6.49) 
-14.39 
(5.45)*** 
-21.81 
(13.15)* 
-6.29 
(6.45) 
∆Polity2 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.1 
(0.11) 
0.76 
(0.37) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
∆Polity22 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.02)* 
∆log M2 
-3.31 
(1.85)* 
-4.33 
(1.93)*** 
-3.35 
(1.95)* 
-0.81 
(2.02) 
0.62 
(2.64) 
-2.58 
(2.01) 
Dummy- SSA 
0.26 
(0.14)** 
0.32 
(0.17)** 
0.1 
(0.16) 
0.33 
(0.14)*** 
0.9 
(0.31)*** 
0.07 
(0.18) 
Constant 
-0.47 
(0.13)*** 
-0.51 
(0.14)*** 
-0.3 
(0.17)* 
-0.64 
(0.13)*** 
-1.09 
(0.34)*** 
-0.38 
(0.17)*** 
N 251 236 225 246 134 211 
Sargan (p>χ2) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.977 0.726 0.899 0.869 
0.366 0.949 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 1.4 
       
Table 1.4: Aid Impact on Growth, based on Annual data (sub-Saharan Africa LDCs, SGMM 
Estimation) 
 UNDP UNFPA 
UNICEF UNTA UNHCR WFP 
∆logrpyt-1 
-27.75 
(7.65)*** 
-30.17 
(7.26)*** 
-29.69 
(7.39)*** 
-28.85 
(8.31)*** 
-35.87 
(10.17)*** 
-27.24 
(9.12)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-21.71 
(4.87)*** 
-25.13 
(5.0)*** 
-21.93 
(4.89)*** 
-22.47 
(5.1)*** 
-26.05 
(5.76)*** 
-22.79 
(5.35)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
11.17 
(2.47)*** 
13.56 
(2.71)*** 
10.75 
(2.48)*** 
11.51 
(2.67)*** 
13.06 
(2.91)*** 
11.26 
(2.72)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
5.11 
(3.17)* 
4.48 
(3.33) 
5.22 
(3.21)* 
5.06 
(3.4) 
5.47 
(5.49) 
5.49 
(3.72) 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.45 
(0.5) 
-0.25 
(0.5) 
-0.46 
(0.5) 
-0.43 
(0.52) 
-0.26 
(0.58) 
-0.36 
(0.54) 
∆log(G) 
2.93 
(2.07) 
2.61 
(2.22) 
2.86 
(2.07) 
2.49 
(2.2) 
3.55 
(3.49) 
2.00 
(2.24) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
-23.58 
(17.14) 
-20.07 
(17.4) 
-19.39 
(17.7) 
-24.78 
(17.76) 
-5.15 
(21.05) 
-2.61 
(20.49) 
∆Polity2 
-0.25 
(0.2) 
-0.19 
(0.33) 
-0.29 
(0.2) 
-0.26 
(0.2) 
0.56 
(0.55) 
0.16 
(0.28) 
∆Polity22 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
∆log M2 
-8.43 
(3.18)*** 
-8.65 
(3.22)*** 
-8.03 
(3.29)*** 
-7.04 
(3.83)** 
-3.83 
(3.78) 
-7.69 
(3.73)*** 
Constant 
-0.51 
(0.18)*** 
-0.57 
(0.24)*** 
-0.45 
(0.2)*** 
-0.52 
(0.19)*** 
-0.27 
(0.23) 
-0.36 
(0.2)* 
N 111 105 111 106 80 97 
Sargan (p>χ2) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.712 0.569 0.685 0.733 
0.376 0.947 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 1.5 
      
Table 1.5: Aid Impact on Growth, based on Annual data (SGMM Estimation) 
 Full Sample Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs 
 
Bilateral 
Group 1 
Bilateral 
Group 2 
Bilateral 
Group 3 
Bilateral 
Group 1 
Bilateral 
Group 2 
Bilateral 
Group 3 
∆logrpyt-1 
-9.14 
(3.18)*** 
-16.37 
(3.96)*** 
-10.56 
(3.12)*** 
-38.75 
(8.55)*** 
-32.03 
(7.69)*** 
-33.51 
(7.61)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-10.07 
(2.8)*** 
-14.32 
(2.9)*** 
-7.55 
(2.64)*** 
-20.96 
(5.05)*** 
-20.8 
(4.82)*** 
-16.2 
(5.04)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
4.96 
(1.5)*** 
7.05 
(1.48)*** 
4.00 
(1.4)*** 
9.93 
(2.53)*** 
8.9 
(2.46)*** 
7.84 
(2.68)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
4.75 
(1.74)*** 
4.34 
(1.5)*** 
5.67 
(1.53)*** 
5.55 
(3.27)* 
3.07 
(2.94) 
7.17 
(3.17)*** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.1 
(0.3) 
-0.06 
(0.3) 
-0.4 
(0.52) 
0.55 
(0.54) 
-0.65 
(0.48) 
∆log(G) 
-2.4 
(1.51) 
-2.09 
(1.51) 
-1.96 
(1.39) 
1.46 
(2.13) 
-1.92 
(2.19) 
1.89 
(2.02) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
-11.74 
(6.36)** 
-37.01 
(8.59)*** 
-17.33 
(5.36) 
-12.98 
(17.28) 
-23.72 
(17.59) 
-9.15 
(16.78) 
∆Polity2 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.26) 
0.27 
(0.29) 
-0.26 
(0.19) 
∆Polity22 
0.04 
(0.02)* 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
∆log M2 
-1.96 
(2.07) 
-0.73 
(1.95) 
-3.77 
(1.86)** 
-7.02 
(3.7)** 
-7.53 
(3.22)*** 
-11.01 
(3.36)*** 
Dummy-SSA 
0.25 
(0.17) 
0.89 
(0.23)*** 
0.18 
(0.14)    
Constant 
-0.38 
(0.19)** 
-1.49 
(0.29)*** 
-0.41 
(0.12)*** 
-0.18 
(0.2) 
-0.43 
(0.31) 
-0.3 
(0.18)* 
N 218 185 252 102 79 109 
Sargan (p>χ2) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.617 0.665 0.986 0.605 0.225 
0.786 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 2.1 
     
Table 2.1: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, 
SGMM Estimation) 
 Total Aid 
Bilateral 
Aid 
Bilateral - 
EU 
Bilateral - 
UK 
Bilateral - 
US 
∆logrpyt-1 
7.25 
(3.72)** 
7.41 
(3.99)** 
9.48 
(3.67)*** 
21.07 
(4.85)*** 
15.53 
(6.96)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) -10.2 (2.82)*** 
-10.41 
(2.98)*** 
-9.41 
(2.66)*** 
-1.56 
(3.57) 
-6.54 
(5.2) 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  4.66 (1.58)*** 
5.03 
(1.64)*** 
4.46 
(1.34)*** 
0.77 
(1.82) 
2.98 
(2.65) 
∆Log(Trade) 6.23 (1.81)*** 
5.98 
(1.89)*** 
6.36 
(2.04)*** 
-0.28 
(2.08) 
3.3 
(2.87) 
∆log (1+Infr) 0.05 (0.37) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
0.07 
(0.4) 
-0.34 
(0.36) 
-0.2 
(0.46) 
∆log(G) -2.1 (2.54) 
-2.51 
(2.51) 
-2.67 
(2.34) 
-1.67 
(2.57) 
-1.77 
(2.69) 
 ∆log(fertility) 24.26 (5.36)*** 
25.67 
(5.57)*** 
27.65 
(5.47)*** 
31.12 
(6.32)*** 
19.22 
(8.05)*** 
∆Polity2 -0.16 (0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
0.37 
(0.19)** 
0.12 
(0.23) 
∆Polity22 0.02 (0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.1 
(0.04)*** 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
Dummy- SSA 2.41 (1.12)*** 
2.56 
(1.11)*** 
2.31 
(1.07)*** 
-0.24 
(1.29) 
0.63 
(1.62) 
Constant -0.55 (0.91) 
-0.38 
(0.96) 
0.12 
(0.89) 
2.68 
(1.62)* 
0.45 
(2.0) 
N 28 28 28 20 23 
Sargan (p>χ2) 0.209 0.1682 0.137 0.921 0.355 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.376 0.4351 0.194 0.834 0.488 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 2.2 
Table 2.2: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, 
SGMM Estimation) 
 Bilateral: Group 1 Bilateral: Group 2 
Bilateral: Group 3 
∆logrpyt-1 
12.98 
(6.44)** 
15.99 
(9.36)* 
7.6 
(4.32)* 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-3.27 
(6.32) 
-1.46 
(6.97) 
-9.83 
(3.1)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
1.17 
(3.54) 
-0.1 
(3.74) 
4.47 
(1.79)*** 
∆Log(Trade) 
3.67 
(2.57) 
5.14 
(3.44) 
6.06 
(1.94)*** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.27 
(0.51) 
0.78 
(0.75) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
∆log(G) 
-0.81 
(3.79) 
-4.72 
(4.23) 
-2.42 
(2.83) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
25.86 
(7.6) 
41.51 
(10.02)*** 
24.19 
(6.36)*** 
∆Polity2 
-0.22 
(0.24) 
0.33 
(0.71) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
∆Polity22 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Dummy-SSA 
0.93 
(1.83) 
2.6 
(2.47) 
2.7 
(1.16)*** 
Constant 
1.75 
(2.17) 
3.66 
(2.73) 
-0.61 
(1.01) 
N 24 20 27 
Sargan (p>χ2) 0.268 0.530 0.230 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.268 0.612 0.453 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 2.3 
      
Table 2.3: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, 
SGMM Estimation) 
 UNDP UNFPA 
UNICEF UNTA WFP 
∆logrpyt-1 
9.3 
(4.41)*** 
18.24 
(5.2)*** 
14.28 
(6.49)*** 
6.52 
(4.28) 
15.99 
(5.17)*** 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-10.44 
(2.96)*** 
-3.05 
(4.25) 
-5.89 
(4.87) 
-8.56 
(3.94)*** 
-2.59 
(3.76) 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
5.65 
(1.5)*** 
2.03 
(2.14) 
2.72 
(2.76) 
4.36 
(2.45)* 
0.68 
(1.88) 
∆Log(Trade) 
4.85 
(2.03)*** 
1.79 
(2.76) 
3.37 
(2.73) 
5.3 
(1.87)*** 
4.75 
(2.27)** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
0.12 
(0.41) 
0.14 
(0.73) 
-0.1 
(0.45) 
0.06 
(0.46) 
-0.09 
(0.35) 
∆log(G) 
-5.31 
(3.04)* 
-4.41 
(6.01) 
-1.75 
(3.23) 
-4.97 
(2.73)* 
-1.29 
(2.35) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
27.80 
(5.83)*** 
7.41 
(11.58) 
27.57 
(7.25)*** 
20.99 
(6.47)*** 
18.54 
(6.1)*** 
∆Polity2 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
0.29 
(0.48) 
-0.06 
(0.2) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
∆Polity22 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Dummy- SSA 
2.75 
(1.19)*** 
1.39 
(2.33) 
0.65 
(1.91) 
2.76 
(1.18)*** 
-0.34 
(1.32) 
Constant 
-0.18 
(1.12) 
-0.66 
(1.52) 
1.33 
(2.02) 
-0.77 
(0.98) 
0.97 
(1.55) 
N 26 20 24 24 23 
Sargan (p>χ2) 0.356 0.781 0.209 0.217 0.643 
Autocorrelation 
(pr > z) 0.762 0.507 0.1873 0.596 
0.575 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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APPENDIX 
 
I. List of Tables  
Table 3.1 
     
Table 3.1: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, FE 
Estimation) 
 Total Aid 
Bilateral 
Aid 
Bilateral - 
EU 
Bilateral - 
UK 
Bilateral - 
US 
logrpyt-1 
0.45 
(0.87) 
0.65 
(0.88) 
0.73 
(0.87) 
0.86 
(0.81) 
0.82 
(0.97) 
Log(Aid/GDP) 
-7.28 
(2.35)*** 
-7.96 
(2.31)*** 
-8.95 
(2.3)*** 
-7.98 
(2.35)*** 
-8.95 
(2.67)*** 
log(Aid/GDP)2  
2.87 
(1.4)** 
3.55 
(1.3)*** 
4.28 
(1.13)*** 
3.69 
(1.21)*** 
4.26 
(1.37)*** 
Log(Trade) 
5.85 
(2.49)*** 
5.24 
(2.43)*** 
5.96 
(2.67)*** 
5.46 
(2.66)** 
5.45 
(3.14)* 
log (1+Infr) 
-0.56 
(0.48) 
-0.53 
(0.48) 
-0.51 
(0.49) 
-0.89 
(0.55) 
-0.62 
(0.53) 
log(G) 
1.61 
(1.66) 
1.63 
(1.68) 
1.34 
(1.66) 
2.03 
(1.84) 
1.43 
(2.05) 
 log(fertility) 
13.32 
(4.22)*** 
12.11 
(4.63)*** 
13.46 
(4.38)*** 
13.61 
(5.29)*** 
15.45 
(6.89)*** 
Polity2 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.18) 
Polity22 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Constant 
-85.6 
(28.91) 
-93 
(29.84) 
-108.45 
(27.78)*** 
-103.04 
(31.81)*** 
-112.84 
(40.25)*** 
N 64 64 64 55 55 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.2 
      
Table 3.2: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, FE 
Estimation) 
 UNDP UNFPA 
UNICEF UNTA WFP 
∆logrpyt-1 
1.07 
(0.83) 
0.79 
(0.84) 
0.9 
(0.67) 
5.87 
(3.34)* 
0.49 
(0.79) 
∆Log(Aid/GDP) 
-8.85 
(2.36)*** 
-8.15 
(2.41)*** 
-5.58 
(2.0)*** 
-4.36 
(3.39) 
-5.87 
(2.55)*** 
∆log(Aid/GDP)2  
4.78 
(1.31)*** 
3.82 
(1.24)*** 
1.36 
(1.17) 
1.45 
(1.91) 
2.34 
(1.32)* 
∆Log(Trade) 
3.7 
(2.54) 
5.32 
(2.59)** 
3.42 
(2.11) 
5.89 
(2.48)*** 
5.71 
(2.54)*** 
∆log (1+Infr) 
-0.42 
(0.51) 
-0.6 
(0.52) 
-0.26 
(0.41) 
-0.8 
(0.52) 
-0.32 
(0.48) 
∆log(G) 
0.44 
(1.79) 
3.09 
(2.23) 
2.93 
(1.6)* 
1.13 
(1.76) 
0.87 
(1.73) 
 ∆log(fertility) 
12.08 
(4.54)*** 
11.68 
(4.55)*** 
11.27 
(3.77)*** 
12.2 
(5.26)*** 
10.95 
(4.46)*** 
∆Polity2 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.2) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
∆Polity22 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
Constant 
-101.29 
(28.64)*** 
-103.42 
(30.31)*** 
-69.06 
(25.11)*** 
-102.71 
(34.61)*** 
-78.49 
(29.33)*** 
N 62 59 57 59 56 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.3 
Table 3.3: Aid Impact on Growth, based on 5-year averaged data (Full sample, FE 
Estimation) 
 Bilateral: Group 1 Bilateral: Group 2 
Bilateral: Group 3 
logrpyt-1 
0.79 
(0.91) 
4.81 
(5.38) 
0.65 
(0.9) 
Log(Aid/GDP) 
-7.53 
(2.78)*** 
-3.28 
(5.89) 
-7.66 
(2.43)*** 
log(Aid/GDP)2  
3.63 
(1.57)*** 
1.22 
(3.65) 
3.43 
(1.42)*** 
Log(Trade) 
3.81 
(2.66) 
8.00 
(3.82)** 
5.18 
(2.5)** 
log (1+Infr) 
-0.53 
(0.51) 
-1.62 
(0.89)* 
-0.52 
(0.49) 
log(G) 
0.99 
(1.98) 
6.67 
(5.28) 
1.94 
(1.8) 
 log(fertility) 
10.56 
(5.7)* 
13.82 
(9.12) 
11.7 
(4.85)*** 
Polity2 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.59 
(0.47) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
Polity22 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Constant 
-86.18 
(35.46)*** 
-117.49 
(71.52) 
-91.82 
(30.97)*** 
N 58 45 63 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are standard errors. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
asterisks (**) at the 5% level, and three asterisks (***) at the 1% level.  
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Table A.1: Sample LDCs  
Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs(30) 
Asia and Latin 
America LDCs (9) 
LDCs excluded from 
Sample (9) 
Benin Mauritania Haiti Sao Tome and Principe 
Burkina Faso Mozambique Bangladesh Afghanistan 
Burundi Niger Bhutan Somalia 
Central African 
Republic Rwanda 
Cambodia 
Nepal 
Myanmar 
Eritrea 
Chad Senegal Lao PDR Kiribati 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Timor-Leste 
Equatorial Guinea Sudan Vanuatu Tuvalu 
Ethiopia Tanzania Yemen, Rep Samoa 
Guinea Togo 
Guinea-Bissau Uganda 
Liberia Zambia 
Madagascar Comoros 
Malawi Djibouti 
Mali 
Gambia, The 
 
Angola 
Lesotho 
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Table A.2 
Table A.2: Variable Description 
Notation Description 
RPYG GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
RPY GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
ODA 
Net official development assistance received (constant 2009 US$) (as % of per 
real GDP) 
Bilateral 
Aid Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, Total (current US$) (% of GDP) 
Group 1 
(G1) 
 Bilateral Aid from: Denmark +Finland +Netherlands +Norway + Sweden (% of 
GDP) 
Group 2 
 Bilateral aid from: G1 + Austria + Canada + Ireland + Switzerland + New Zealand 
(% of GDP) 
Group 3  Bilateral aid from: G1 + Belgium + France + Switzerland + UK + US (% of GDP) 
US Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, United States (current US$) (% of GDP) 
UK 
Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, United Kingdom (current US$) (% of 
GDP) 
EU 
Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, European Union institutions (current 
US$) (% of GDP) 
UNDP Net official flows from UN agencies, UNDP (current US$) (% of GDP) 
UNFPA Net official flows from UN agencies, UNFPA (current US$) (% of GDP) 
UNHCR Net official flows from UN agencies, UNHCR (current US$) (% of GDP) 
UNICEF Net official flows from UN agencies, UNICEF (current US$) (% of GDP) 
UNTA Net official flows from UN agencies, UNTA (current US$) (% of GDP) 
WFP Net official flows from UN agencies, WFP (current US$) (% of GDP) 
M2 Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 
Fertility Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 
Infl Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Polity2  
 Polity2 index from the polity IV project (2011). The index is measured on a scale 
of -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) 
Trade Trade (% of GDP) 
G General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
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Table A.3 
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Selected variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max N 
RPYG 1.066 7.265 -50.29 92.586 1222 
ODA 25.807 22.517 0.169 144.910 1267 
Bilateral Aid 4.051 6.289 -0.014 47.359 1267 
Group 1 1.347 2.361 -0.021 24.491 1267 
Group 2 2.090 2.572 -0.522 16.456 814 
Group 3 5.470 5.508 -0.048 69.663 1267 
US 0.509 1.149 -0.002 25.460 1267 
UK 1.187 2.557 -0.017 32.758 1267 
EU 7.354 9.421 -0.070 103.003 1264 
UNDP 0.386 0.502 -0.002 3.810 1267 
UNFPA 0.067 0.079 0.000 0.659 1190 
UNHCR 0.145 0.599 0.000 9.970 1267 
UNICEF 0.189 0.353 0.000 5.680 1267 
UNTA 0.115 0.160 0.000 2.270 1267 
WFP 0.495 2.280 -3.770 47.329 1267 
M2 22.23 59.8 -68.37 1021.901 1186 
Fertility rate 9.813 12.074 2.245 63.160 647 
Inflation rate 56.281 764.908 -17.64 23773.130 1055 
Polity2 Index -2.18 5.44 -10.0 9.0 1334 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                      
1 UNDP (United Nations Development Programs), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s 
Fund), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), UNTA (United Nations Transitions 
authority), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), WFP (World Food 
Program) 
2 See Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000 for discussions on the linkage between population growth 
and capital accumulation.  
3 See an example in Sachs (2005, page 250) regarding an impassable road due to a missing 
bridge for further explanation on the threshold effects.  
4 For more discussions on the takeoff hypothesis, please see Easterly, William, 2006. 
“Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps and Takeoffs in Economic Development”. 
Journal of Economic Growth. Vol. 11(4), pp289-318 
5 It is generally assumed that multilateral aid tend to be development in nature (assuming 
short run shocks) 
6 Aid disbursed to political allies regardless of a country’s policy and institutional 
environment. For example, Israel and Egypt have benefited from aid flows from United 
States due to regional strategic reasons. 
7 For example, there is substantial evidence of neutral effects of aid on growth (Easterly, 
2007a, 2007b, 2005; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004; Boone, 1994, 1996). Others 
have found depressing effects7 (Bobba and Powell, 2005). Yet, some have found positive 
relationship between aid and growth (Clemens, et al, 2004; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). 
8 Africa: Eritrea, Somalia and Sao Tome and Principe. East Asia: Afghanistan, Kiribati, 
Myanmar, Samoa, Timor Leste, Tuvalu.  
9 The Commitment to Development Index ranks 22 of the world’s richest countries on their 
dedication to policies that benefit the 5.5 billion people living in poorer nations. Moving 
beyond standard comparisons of foreign aid volumes, the CDI quantifies a range of rich-
country policies that affect poor people in developing countries: Quantity and quality of 
aid; Openness to exports; Investment policies; Migration policies; Environmental policies; 
Security policies and Support for new technologies 
 
10 We use these groupings as a proxy to capture the effects of development aid. The best 
approach to determining whether specific aid is development friendly or not, would be to 
use sector level aid disbursements data. However, such data is not available for our study 
period.   
11 We do not have enough data for our sample of countries on budget surplus.  
46 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Several studies have tested the interaction between aid and the Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) policy index and they found the interaction to be insignificant. See Easterly et.al, 
2003; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001 and Lensink and White, 
2001.  
13 They caution that money supply (M2 or M3) as a share of GDP does not capture the 
quality of the financial market development. However, the bias that may arise from the 
quality effects is not central to this study.   
